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Mediation scholars have long debated which mediator “style”
or “model” is correct.  The origin of the debate arises from a foun-
dational piece of scholarship by Leonard Riskin.  Riskin proposed
a “grid” of mediator orientations comprised of what came to be
known as “facilitative mediation” and “evaluative mediation.”1  A
more recent addition to the grid—and one that is almost univer-
sally recognized as a distinct model—is “transformative media-
tion.”2  These three models are so embedded in the literature of
mediation that they have been called “the big three.”3
* Dean Gilbert A. Holmes Professor of Clinical Theory and Practice, Director of Clinical
Education, University of Baltimore School of Law.  The author gratefully acknowledges the Uni-
versity of Baltimore School of Law for a summer research fellowship in order to facilitate com-
pletion of this Article and the continuing support of Randi E. Schwartz.
1 Leonard Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994); Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strate-
gies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996).  Despite its
extraordinary success, or perhaps because of it, Professor Riskin himself has subsequently ex-
pressed reservations about how his “grid” has come to be used.  Leonard Riskin, Decision-Mak-
ing in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(2003).
2 ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (rev. ed. 2004).  There are other “named” ap-
proaches to mediation in the literature, and, while sometimes offering important perspectives,
they have not become embedded in the professional consciousness as the three mentioned in the
text.  For examples of these others approaches, see KENNETH R. MELCHIN & CHERYL A. PIC-
ARD, TRANSFORMING CONFLICT THROUGH INSIGHT (2008); JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK,
NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2001). There are sub-
stantial points of agreement among “Insight Mediation,” “Narrative Mediation,” and “Trans-
formative Mediation,” albeit with different emphases in the roles mediators undertake.  For a
discussion of these commonalities, see Cheryl Picard & Janet Siltanen, Exploring the Significance
of Emotion for Mediation Practice, 31 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 31, 33–34 (2013).
3 Dorothy J. Della Noce, Evaluative Mediation: In Search of Practice Competencies, 27 CON-
FLICT RESOL. Q. 193, 195 (2009).  While this Article adopts the almost universal distinctions
among these approaches, some have noted that they simplify debates about what these ap-
proaches mean.  Lorig Charkoudian et al., Mediation by Any Other Name Would Smell as
Sweet—Or Would It?  The Struggle to Define Mediation and Its Various Approaches, 26 CON-
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The influence of Riskin’s work cannot be overstated.  It has
resonated within the community of mediation scholars and practi-
tioners, suffusing discussions about what constitutes best practices
in the field,4 scholarship,5 and law school texts.6  The debate is
sometimes framed not as choices, but as what is “true” mediation.7
There is, however, a radical disconnect between the rhetoric
and reality of mediation.  This disconnect has to do with the nature
of mediation “on the ground” in contrast to the way a “typical me-
diation” is presented through scholarship, texts, and trainings.  The
usual way of approaching mediation is that participants have ade-
quate time to engage in mediation and to secure the mediator of
their choice.  Participants have resources aplenty, enabling
mediators to practice at a leisurely pace and facilitating their ability
to reap the benefits that mediation has to offer.8  These techniques
include, among others, transforming “positions” into “interests,”9
enabling parties to engage in creative problem-solving,10 crafting
detailed agreements that are more flexible and finely tuned to the
needs of participants than a judge could order,11 and allowing par-
FLICT RESOL. Q. 293, 313 (2009) (noting a lack of agreement as to defining “approaches to
mediation”).
4 JOHN W. COLLEY, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK 31–34 (2d ed. 2006).
5 DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 29–91
(Jay Folberg et al. eds., 2004).  This anthology contains three articles that argue, respectively,
that facilitative, transformative, and evaluative styles of mediation are best.
6 A popular text used in both law school and non-law school contexts addresses the debate
at some length. KIMBERLEE KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 46 (3d ed. 2004).
For texts that do the same, although directed to primarily a law school audience, see DWIGHT
GOLANN & JAY FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF ADVOCATE AND NEUTRAL 112–15 (2d
ed. 2010); JAMES ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 140–48 (2d ed. 2006); LAU-
RENCE J. BOULLE ET AL., MEDIATION: SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES 12–14 (2008).  These texts have
assumed particular importance as mediation has increasingly become an important part of law
school curricula. See Michael B. Mushlin & Lisa Margaret Smith, The Professor and the Judge:
Introducing First-Year Students to the Law in Context, 45 J. LEG. EDUC. 149, 167 (2014).
7 Kimberlee Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s Grid, 3
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 80 (1998) (characterizing evaluative mediation as “off the mediation
map”); Lisa P. Gaynier, Transformative Mediation: In Search of a Theory of Practice, 22 CON-
FLICT RESOL. Q. 397 (2005).  Some commentators, however, do reject such “purity” of models as
misleadingly rigid and doctrinaire. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic:
Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 247.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 116–42.
9 The text that established this distinction—and a text that has proven enormously influen-
tial in both mediation and negotiation literature—is ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (rev. ed. 2011).
10 Jay FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING
CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 10 (1995); Riskin, supra note 1, at 111–14.
11 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers
from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 416 (1997).
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ties to be in control of their own destiny.12  These strategies, tech-
niques, and conceptions, as proponents of mediation remind us,
distinguish mediation from litigation not just in terms of emphasis,
but, rather, in terms of the foundations of how to conceptualize,
and thereby resolve, disputes.13
The irony, though, is that parties who are least in control of
their own destinies to begin with—those with the fewest resources
to command in a society where resources often define empower-
ment in civic and private life—are least likely to enjoy the fruits of
mediation.14  The mediation available to such individuals is the
merest shadow—if that—of the promise of mediation.15  With
these institutional constraints, parties and mediators have little
time for leisurely rounds of creative problem-solving.  Particularly
in court-annexed programs—the places where most mediations
take place—time is short, resources are limited, and the choice of
mediator is non-existent.16  Moreover, the actuality or potential of
retaining attorneys—often assumed—is meaningless for those who
cannot retain private or legal services lawyers to begin with.17
These litigants thus must enter mediation through one gate only,
and what awaits them beyond that gate is out of their control.
These circumstances limit the application of the “models” de-
bate.  Facilitative and transformative models of mediation, or some
combination thereof, might be the most effective mediation or the
only type of mediation that deserves the name “mediation.”18
Evaluative mediation, however, tends to be the most efficient, and
efficiency is a primary goal of court-connected mediation, even if
the rhetoric of such programs suggests otherwise.19  The “best” me-
diation, then, is not, for many litigants, a possible one.  The debate
about best practices of mediation thus must be informed by an un-
12 This core value of mediation is usually framed as “self-determination.”  The Joint Code—
Standards of Conduct, the preeminent set of ethical norms in mediation, lists “self-determina-
tion” as its first “standard.”  For an extensive discussion of “self-determination” and court-con-
nected mediation programs, see Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in
Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1 (2001).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 40–51.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 52–115.
15 This phrase is from an influential book that describes the idea of “transformative media-
tion.” BUSH, supra note 2.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 64–105.
17 See infra notes 164–69.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 46–47.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 80–91.
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derstanding of the socioeconomic contexts in which many media-
tions take place.
These are troubling facts.  Some existing literature does ex-
plore how mediation must be viewed both in terms of its social
situatedness and the purposes for which it is undertaken20 and
there are critiques of the limitations of mediation among low-in-
come participants,21 but the crucial importance of the interaction of
“models” with what many low-income participants must and do ex-
perience warrants far more scrutiny.  While texts examine “special-
ized applications of mediation” in substantive areas, such as in
agricultural disputes and sports,22 and in different countries and
cultures,23 virtually no textbooks and few mediation trainings al-
lude to mediation in court-annexed contexts except in passing.
This situation at best betrays the promise of mediation and at worst
damages those with the fewest resources and, paradoxically, the
most to lose.  This not only might create “bad mediation,” but also
a means to intensify conflict and promote injustice.24
This Article will survey these issues in three parts.  First, it will
offer an overview of mediation models not so much with a view to
assessing which is the “best,” but, rather, with a view to examining
what assumptions about time and resources are embedded within
each.25  The Article will offer an overview of mediation as prac-
ticed in a binary universe: that of private mediation and that of
court-annexed mediation.  The Article will also examine the day-
to-day life of low-income litigants, and how their lives call into
question bedrock assumptions about mediation.  The Article then
comes full circle and returns to models of mediation.  This time,
however, the examination will be in light of the impact that the
inequality of resources has on what model is most likely to be fol-
lowed when resources are limited.  The Article concludes with rec-
ommendations for how the realities of mediation “on the ground”
can inform best practices of mediation.26
20 See infra text accompanying notes 118–19.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 144–51.
22 Many texts do discuss mediation in different substantive areas. KOVACH, supra note 6, at
479–505 (describing “specialized applications of mediation, “such as agricultural disputes, em-
ployment, religious institutions, and sports teams”); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION
PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 22–33 (3d ed. 2003) (same).
23 MOORE, supra note 22, at 33–42 (describing mediation in Asia, Australia, New Zealand,
Melanesia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe).
24 BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT 16 (2d ed. 2012) (“time constraints” and
“physical settings” might have an impact on the intensity of conflict).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 35–51.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 179–92.
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II. IDEALIZED MEDIATION
A. How Is Mediation Defined?
So how is mediation defined?  There is no consensus,27 al-
though the following represents one effort:
[M]ediation is generally defined as the intervention in a negotia-
tion or a conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or
no authoritative decision-making power but who assists the in-
volved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable set-
tlement of issues in dispute.  In addition to addressing
substantive issues, mediation may also establish or strengthen
relationships of trust and respect between parties or terminate
relationships in a manner that minimizes costs and psychological
harm.28
A more succinct definition, found widely in the literature, is
that mediation is a “process whereby a third party neutral (or two
neutrals when there are co-mediators) acts as a facilitator to assist
in resolving a dispute between two or more parties.“29  State stat-
utes offer variations of these themes.30
One notable aspect of these definitions is how general they
are.  They represent non-controversial premises which many
mediators would agree on: mediation is a voluntary process
through which participants can choose to reach a resolution or
not;31 a mediator is not a “decision-maker” who can impose out-
comes on participants;32 a mediator must be unbiased and free of
conflicts of interest;33 and a mediator may engage in a “private cau-
27 Charkoudian, supra note 3, at 313.
28 MOORE, supra note 22, at 15.
29 KOVACH, supra note 6, at 14.
30 Virginia is a representative example: mediation is “a process in which a neutral facilitates
communication between the parties, and, without deciding the issues or imposing a solution on
the parties, enables them to understand and to reach a mutually agreeable resolution to their
dispute.” VA. CODE § 8.01-576.4 (2010).
31 For example, the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators—the preeminent code
crafted by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association, and the Asso-
ciation for Conflict Resolution—identifies “self-determination” as its first standard. MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (A.B.A. ET AL., 2005) [hereinafter MODEL STAN-
DARDS]. The Model Standards define “self-determination” as “the act of coming to a voluntary,
uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and out-
come.”  Participants also have the power to withdraw from the process if they so choose. Id; see
also Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247, 1247 (2009).
32 This idea also relates to the idea of “self-determination.” Id.
33 Model Standards, supra note 31, Standards II & III.
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cus” in which the mediator meets separately and confidentially
with individual mediation participants.34  Thus, a mediator’s suc-
cess emerges from the use of a range of techniques and not from
the imposition of some externally granted authority.
B. Ideals of Models of Mediation
A general definition, however, does not reflect the debate
about how best to conceptualize and practice mediation.  What fol-
lows is a brief overview of this “models” debate as well as an over-
view of these models’ similarities and differences.35
1. Evaluative Mediation
Evaluative mediators take an active role in conducting media-
tion.  One commentator describes the evaluative approach as “es-
tablish[ing] an expectation that the mediator will make assessments
about the conflict as well as its resolution and communicate those
assessments to the parties.”36  While evaluative mediators often
predict the strength of participants’ cases and anticipated outcomes
in adjudication, evaluative mediation can involve freely offering
other types of assessments, which might include whether agree-
ments are “fair” in a non-legal sense37 or whether agreements em-
body the most appropriate resolutions of different aspects of a
conflict.38
That said, the premise of evaluative mediation is that partici-
pants should know what will likely happen in court.  This model
thus makes several assumptions.  One is that a mediator is in a po-
sition to make meaningful assessments about the legal merits of
different positions in the case.  Another is that mediators are find-
34 For discussions of this common mediation technique, see MOORE, supra note 22, at
369–77; KOVACH, supra note 6.
35 It is also noteworthy that the following discussion assumes a “purity” that few mediators
approach in practice.  In other words, it is common for mediators to be pragmatic, incorporating
a range of “styles” consciously or subconsciously as circumstances warrant. See, e.g., Stempel,
supra note 7.
36 L. Randolph Lowry, Evaluative Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MOD-
ELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 72 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 2004).
37 For a sustained defense of an evaluative approach, see Lowry, supra note 36.
38 An interesting way of thinking through this issue is in Ellen Waldman, Identifying the Role
of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1997).  Wald-
man proposes three models: “norm generated,” “norm educating,” and “norm advocating.”
“Norm advocating,” in Waldman’s conception, is a mediator who acts as a “safeguarder of social
norms and values” —a role that resonates with the transformative approach. Id. at 150.
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ers of fact because predictions about the application of law presup-
pose establishing facts that would bring the law into play.
Proponents of evaluative mediation view this process as “effi-
cient”: “evaluation expressed at the appropriate point shortens the
time of dialogue and moves the mediation toward settlement.”39
An evaluative mediator thus assumes an active role in order to pro-
mote settlement.
2. Facilitative Mediation
Facilitative mediators hold that participants, not mediators,
should define and assess the nature of their own conflicts and how
best to resolve them.40  Such mediators facilitate the process, and,
in doing so, argue that the assessments characteristic of evaluative
mediation are inappropriate: evaluation of legal positions, crafting
issue identification, or assessing fairness of proposed resolution are
inconsistent with the role of a mediator.41
A specific characteristic that distinguishes facilitative media-
tion from evaluative mediation relates to its treatment of the past.
Litigation is concerned with what has happened in order to apply
legal rules, which, in turn, generates a result in accordance with
law.42  To put it somewhat differently, “fact finders” in litigation
are historians, examining “evidence” to predict what happened.
In contrast, facilitative mediators encourage a forward-looking
orientation.  Sara Cobb and Janet Rifkin offer a compelling
description of this process in terms of narrative theory: “[t]he me-
diator’s interest in the story is not in the past but in the present and
the future; thus the story is an instrument through which mediators
may shift attention from retrospective positions and accounts to
prospective stories, effectively disconnecting the problem from its
history, from its roots.”43
39 Lowry, supra note 36, at 77.
40 Leonard Riskin offers a succinct statement of this idea:  A “mediator assumes the parties
are intelligent, able to work with their counterparts, and capable of understanding their situa-
tions better than either their lawyers or the mediator. . . . [T]he facilitative mediator assumes
that his principal mission is to enhance and clarify communications between the parties in order
to help them decide what to do.”  Riskin, supra note 1, at 111–14.
41 This would not extend to reporting of child abuse or other circumstances where disclosure
is mandated or permitted by applicable rules of ethics.
42 I have explored this idea in some detail in Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation,
and Alternative Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 843–46 (2004).
43 Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality as a Discursive Practice: The Construction and Trans-
formation of Narratives in Community Mediation, 11 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 69, 71 (1991).  This,
however, is not an absolute rule, and facilitative mediators freely acknowledge that exploration
of the past, and the corresponding catharsis that might arise from that exploration, can be an
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Moreover, facilitative mediation, quite explicitly, seeks to set
aside the dominance of legal norms in conventional, litigation-
based views of conflict resolution.  An early and influential articu-
lation of this was by Lon Fuller in 1971.  Fuller viewed mediation
as a means to liberate participants from the “encumbrance of
rules”: it “accept[s], instead, a relationship of mutual respect,
trust[,] and understanding that will enable them to meet shared
contingencies without the aid of formal prescriptions laid down in
advance.”44
Consider, then, the profound differences between evaluative
and facilitative mediation.  Facilitative mediation focuses on the fu-
ture and thereby sets aside law—Fuller’s “formal prescriptions laid
down in advance.”  In contrast, evaluative mediators evaluate, and
the crux of the evaluation is law—the “formal rules” that Fuller
and others characterize as exactly what mediation is not.  “Facts”
are defined by mediation participants, and what facts are “rele-
vant” is a decision made by participants whether or not they would
be admissible under rules of evidence.45
Adherents of the “facilitative” model heatedly criticize evalua-
tive mediation.  In an article tellingly entitled “The Top Ten Rea-
sons Why Mediators Should not Evaluate,” Lela P. Love argues,
among other things, that evaluators engage in an adversarial pro-
cess virtually indistinguishable from litigation and, thus, mislead-
ingly label themselves mediators when they are not.46  Moreover,
facilitative mediators, unlike evaluative mediators, do not cite effi-
ciency as a legitimate goal or benefit of mediation.  Indeed, a cru-
cial issue is how facilitative mediation—with its expansive,
problem-solving orientation—can be done in a brief period of
time—a topic to which this Article turns below.47
3. Transformative Mediation
Transformative mediators assume an even less active role than
a facilitative mediator.  Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph A. Fol-
integral part of mediation. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 22, at 162–69; Kovach, supra note 6, at
48–49.
44 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325–26
(1971).
45 For an extended discussion of this idea, see Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts
and Meaning in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REV. 61, 78–82 (2010).
46 Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 937, 937–38 (1997).  Love argues that an evaluative process needs to be “properly adver-
tised” and “accurately labeled.” Id. at 948.
47 See infra text accompanying notes 131–42.
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ger, the founders of transformative mediation, characterize trans-
formative mediation as follows:
The mediation process contains within it a unique potential for
transforming conflict interaction and, as a result, changing the
mindset of people who are involved in the process.  The trans-
formative potential stems from mediation’s capacity to generate
two important dynamic effects: empowerment and recognition.
In simplest terms, empowerment means the restoration to indi-
viduals of a sense of their value and strength and their own ca-
pacity to make decisions and handle life’s problems.
Recognition means the evocation in individuals of acknowledg-
ment, understanding, or empathy for the situation and views of
the other . . . . [P]arties are helped to transform their conflict
interaction—from destructive to constructive—and to experi-
ence the personal effects of such transformation.48
A critical characteristic of transformative mediation is that it is
not settlement-driven.  While settling conflict might be a byproduct
of the process, Bush and Folger repeatedly note that the mediation
process is about “empowerment” and “recognition” shifts, not the
“settlement” of a particular dispute.49
There is another radical yet more subtle dimension of the
transformative model.  Its goal is not that the mediator or partici-
pants should develop or adhere to “rules” whether they are, in
Fuller’s conception, laid down “in advance” or not.  Rather, the
mediator only follows where participants want to go.50  As opposed
to facilitative mediators, transformative mediators do not en-
courage participants to look to the future, or to brainstorm, or to
problem-solve, or to focus on “interests” rather than “positions.”
Moreover, while a transformative mediation might lead to “settle-
ment” or adherence to or development of “rules” of one kind or
another, this is not the mediator’s concern.51  A “goal,” if it can
even be characterized as such, is embedded in the name “trans-
formative”: a hope, if it happens, that the quality of participants’
interaction will be transformed in a positive way.  Resolving a dis-
pute, then, might happen, but it is not a goal of transformative
mediation.
48 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 22–23.
49 Id. at 87.
50 Id. at 68 (referring to a mediator’s goal to “allow” movement rather than trying to “move
parties forward”).
51 Id. at 239–47 (critiquing “settlement-oriented mediators” and “practices”).
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III. THE SOCIOECONOMICS OF MEDIATION
Proponents of models of mediation—whichever those models
might be—rarely describe them in the context of the minimal fi-
nancial resources available to many mediation participants.  In re-
ality, there is a socioeconomic divide between those who can afford
private mediators and those who must use court-connected media-
tion services that offer or mandate either free or lower cost media-
tion.  What follows is a brief overview of these two contexts.
A. Private Mediation
Those who have resources need not rely on services available
through courts or community organizations.  Instead, they can and
do buy mediation services privately whether or not a matter is
pending in court.  As with the legal profession, the world of private
mediation ranges from solo or small groups of mediators to large
firms.
There are a number of well-recognized firms that offer media-
tion services.  The American Arbitration Association offers an es-
tablished mediation program with mediators who are “[f]ormer
federal and state judges, attorneys with exceptional subject matter
expertise, and business owners.”52  The roster of mediators associ-
ated with another organization—JAMS—comprises of retired
judges or “high-dollar commercial litigators.”53  CDR Associates54
provides services to “leaders and managers in the private sector,
government, diverse organizations and public interest groups.”55
CPR offers neutrals and membership comprised of “industry
elite—in-house counsel, attorneys and neutrals handling the most
52 Arbitrators & Mediators, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/arbitratorsmedia
tors?_afrLoop=1381674035117554&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=fmcttyw6k_93#%40%
3F_afrWindowId%3Dfmcttyw6k_93%26_afrLoop%3D1381674035117554%26_afrWindow
Mode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dfmcttyw6k_125 (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). See also Maurits
Barendrecht & Christopher Honeyman, Dispute Resolution: Existing Business Models and
Looming Disruptions, 20 DISPUTE RESOL. MAG.17, 18 (2014).
53 Barendrecht, supra note 52, at 18.  The judge-as-neutral focus is reflected in the acronym
“JAMS,” which stands for “Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service.”
54 “CDR” stands for “collaborative decision resources.” CDR ASSOCIATES, http://cdrassoci
ates.org/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
55 Id.
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sophisticated commercial matters.”56  Such organizations have
well-developed processes for selecting and paying mediators.57
In addition to these large national firms, other groups of pri-
vate mediators serve defined geographic areas.58  There are solo
private practitioners who mediate exclusively or combine private
mediation with other types of professional activities, such as prac-
ticing law.  Indeed, an increasing amount of literature focuses on
how to pursue a mediation practice.59
While participants who retain private mediators may not have
unlimited resources, they do have enough to accommodate the
“leisurely style” of many private mediators,60 although private
mediators do allocate time in line with the ability of parties to
pay.61  There are also searchable websites for consumers who wish
to find a private mediator, thus providing some competition among
private mediators.62
In any event, there is nothing particularly surprising that most
private mediators provide services to substantially resourced orga-
nizations and individuals: after all, the legal system is, in most re-
56 Members, CPR, http://www.cpradr.org/Membership/Members.aspx (last visited Jan. 3,
2016).
57 For a summary of how CDR, JAMS, and AAA, as well as NASD, handle these issues, see
Kathleen M. Scanlon, A Comparison Chart of Mediation Processes, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 3 (1999).
58 An example is the McCammon Group, which primarily serves Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia. THE MCCAMMON GROUP, http://www.mccammongroup.com/ (last visited
Jan. 3, 2016).  Fees range from a low of $200 per hour to $450 per hour depending on the amount
in dispute and where the sessions will take place. Civil Dispute Fee Schedule, THE MCCAMMON
GROUP, http://www.mccammongroup.com/fees/civil-dispute-fee-schedule/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2016).
59 See, e.g., Joseph H. Paulk, So You Want To Be a Mediator?  Realistic Considerations for
Attorneys Considering Becoming Mediators, 35 TULSA L.J. 325 (2000); Urska Velikonja, Making
Peace and Making Money: Economic Analysis of the Market for Mediators in Private Practice, 72
ALB. L. REV. 257 (2009); David Plimpton, The ADR Field and Marketplace: Evolution, Growth,
Taking Stock, and Where to From Here, 32 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 69 (2014);
Henry Seiden & Tracey Baker, Define Yourself—Or Others Will . . . How To Get Started in the
ADR Market, ACRESOLUTION 2010 22.
60 Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 249 (2002–03) (noting
how “there is every reason to believe that private mediations will last significantly longer” than
the ones in court).
61 STACY LEE BURNS, MAKING SETTLEMENT WORK: AN EXAMINATION OF THE WORK OF
JUDICIAL MEDIATORS 131, 211 (2000).
62 A prominent example is Mediate.com. MEDIATE.COM (last visited Jan. 3, 2016), http://
www.mediate.com/civil/.
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spects, defined in the same way, with increasing numbers of
lawyers representing large businesses.63
B. Court-Annexed Mediation
Increasingly, courts are turning to court-connected mediation
as a means to resolve disputes.64  All fifty states have some form of
court-connected mediation65 and a large percentage of mediations
occur through such “public programs.”66  As we will see, most of
these programs are docket-clearing devices67 in a time of shrinking
resources.  They have also been subject to scrutiny and critique.68
The characteristics of court-annexed programs are often dis-
tinct from one another, and there is a risk that an analysis can paint
with too broad a brush given that some jurisdictions allocate mini-
mal resources to mediation programs while others do have robust
programs in terms of resources and implementation.69  Neverthe-
less, there are commonalities, and what follows is an overview of
the world of court-annexed mediation based on the socioeconomic
status of litigants who participate in them.
63 I have elsewhere detailed the stratification of the legal profession and its consequences for
the administration of justice.  Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL
PROF. 89 (2004–2005).
64 SARAH COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE Appendix A (2013–14 ed.
2013); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2007–09 (1999).
65 There is court-connected mediation in all fifty states (Court ADR Across the U.S., RSI’S
COURT ADR RESOURCE CENTER, http://courtadr.org/court-adr-across-the-us/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2016)) and the federal government (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 §§ 3–10, 28
U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1998)). See also Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Movement is Reshaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165,
185–88 (2003).
66 Specific statistics on this point are difficult to come by.  What evidence there is, however,
does suggest an extremely large number. Velikonja, supra note 59, at 270 (“a large percentage of
disputes, perhaps as many as half, are mediated in free public programs”).
67 Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time of Crisis, a Time of Change, 95 MAR-
QUETTE L. REV. 993 (2012).
68 J. Brad Reich, A Call for Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform Mediation Act’s
Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 197, 226 (alluding to critiques of mediation as
“second class” justice); Mordehai Mironi, Mediation v. Case Settlement: The Unsettling Relations
between Courts and Mediation—A Case Study, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 173 (2014); Engler,
supra note 64, at 2031–2036 (1999); Carol J. King, Burdening Access to Justice: The Cost of
Divorce Mediation on the Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 375 (1999).
69 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, What We Know (and Need to Know) about Court-An-
nexed Dispute Resolution, 67 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (describing a study by the Ameri-
can Bar Association regarding the success of court-annexed mediation in Maryland).
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1. The Cases Low-Income People Mediate
Low-income people experience legal conflict repeatedly in
their daily lives.  As Stephen Wexler evocatively put it, “poor peo-
ple are always bumping into sharp legal things.”70  While some of
these “sharp legal things” do not turn into formal judicial or ad-
ministrative proceedings, many do.  Scholars have examined the
nature of these cases, often under the category of “access to jus-
tice.”71  The nature of cases handled through court-annexed media-
tion programs track the types of cases low-income people confront
more generally.72  These include bankruptcy,73 family law,74 land-
lord-tenant,75 debt collection,76 and foreclosure.77  There are also
other types of mediated cases apart from these large categories.78
There are two ways to handle a large volume of cases.  One is
to have participants wait to participate with whatever limited num-
ber of mediators are available.  One observer noticed such an ex-
ample in Boston’s Housing Court: on one day there were seventy
people waiting to mediate in five available rooms.79  A more com-
mon way is to impose brief time frames in which to mediate—a
70 Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1050 (1970).
71 A well-known example by a leading scholar in the field is DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS
TO JUSTICE (2004).  An earlier “classic” treatment is JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
72 There have been important studies of court-annexed mediation that distinguish among
different types of cases. See, e.g., John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases in State
Courts: A Litigant’s Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 815,
814–15 (1999) (distinguishing among “small claims, domestic relations, and civil”).
73 Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can
Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 427, 430–32 (2009).
74 Carol J. King, supra note 68, at 379.
75 Tina Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice for Legal Services
Clients, 10 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 181 (2003).
76 These are sometimes called euphemistically “resolution conferences.”  Peter A. Holland,
Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 27 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 179 (2014).
77 This has been a particularly growing area for mediation.  Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in
Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889
(2013).
78 See Kristen M. Blankley, Adding By Subtracting: How Limited Scope Agreements for Dis-
pute Resolution Representation Can Increase Access to Attorney Services, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 659, 660–61 (2013) (describing dispute resolution in a small personal injury matter).
79 Zimmerman, supra note 75, at 196.  An interesting analogy is lawyers and law firms that
can only make a profit through a large “volume” business, which, inevitably, means lawyers can
only devote a small amount of time to an individual case. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 117
(1974), For a description of a business model along these lines, see PHILIP B. HEYMANN &
LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 46–66 (1988).
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kind of speed mediation.  Such a process reduces waiting times and
increases the number of matters that are resolved.
2. A Primary Purpose for Court-Annexed Mediation:
Clearing Dockets
A primary goal of court-annexed mediation is docket con-
trol.80  This point has been made by judges,81 scholars,82 adminis-
trators,83 and mediators themselves.84  The virtues of mediation as
a docket control device span a wide range of fora, from state to
federal courts,85 and extending even to courts in other countries.86
80 Boyarin, supra note 67.
81 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (“[d]iverting cases to mediation would provide a faster and less expensive resolution
for the parties and, by reducing the number of cases that go to trial, would permit courts to
process cases more efficiently, conserve judicial resources, and allow judge to give more atten-
tion to cases requiring their expertise in resolving legal issues”).
82 See, e.g., Will Pryor, What’s Wrong with Mediation These Days, and How Can We Fix It?,
32 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 71 (2014) (“some courts have become addicted to medi-
ation referral as a means of docket control”); Kathleen M. Scanlon, A Case for Judicial Account-
ability: When Courts Add a Settlement Detour to the Traditional Appellate “Path,” 17 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 379, 413 (2002) (federal “circuit courts are managing their dockets in part by
using court mediation programs”); Louise Phipps-Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the
Courts: Progress, Problems, and Possibilities, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 327, 335 (2003) (“as more
and more courts have embraced mediation, they have done so primarily based on the promise of
increased efficiency: the promise that mediation would reduce court dockets, increase settlement
rates, and speed up case processing”).  This is not a new observation.  Owen Fiss, in a well-
known article, noted that “settlement”—which he defines as including both ADR and media-
tion—constitutes a “problematic technique for streamlining dockets.”  Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.  1073, 1075 (1984).
83 How To Prevent Mediation from Running Aground, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 3, 7 (2005) (quoting a “senior settlement attorney” for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
as saying that “appeals court mediation programs exist for docket control purposes”).
84 Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the End
for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 378 (2009) (quoting a mediator in court-
connected mediation who describes the “expectations of their workplace” are to deliver settle-
ments in a “fraction of the time required to effectively do so”).
85 Christopher Fugarino, Mandating Mediation for Cases before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims Can Improve the Efficiency of the Court and the Experience of the Parties, 16
FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 384 (2007) (“[m]andatory mediation . . . may benefit the [Court] by increasing
settlements and reducing the docket”).  This goal has even been undertaken in ostensibly un-
likely settings, such as criminal courts.  Maureen E. Laflin, Criminal Mediation Has Taken Root
in Idaho’s Courts, 56 THE ADVOCATE 37 (2013) (an Idaho Rule providing for mediation in crimi-
nal cases “focuses primarily on case management mediation or facilitated plea bargaining, which
are settlement driven in order to save counties money and reduce burgeoning dockets”).  An
important set of guidelines entitled the National Standards for Court-Connected Programs is
also candid in noting in its introduction that a value of mediation is that it “usually requires less
time and fewer resources than trials and produces earlier settlements.” NATIONAL STANDARDS
FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS (CTR. FOR DISP. SETTLEMENT & INST. OF JUD.
ADMIN. 1999).
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Some sources frame the goal slightly differently by comparing me-
diation to “settlement conferences.”87  Empirical studies have ex-
amined the degree to which mediation “frees” court time88 and
success in this regard is cited as a means to assess the value of
court-annexed programs.89
3. The Background of the Mediators
Apart from the time limitations under which court-connected
mediators operate, the quality of the mediators in court-annexed
programs can be wildly variable.90  Mediators might be placed on
court rosters through connections to the bench and bar or in order
to gain experience, not to use their experience.91  While some
mediators are skilled and do their best given the constraints of the
programs in which they mediate, others are “experienced” only in
court-annexed mediation and are not fully or even partially versed
86 Mironi, supra note 68, 176 (2014) (in Israel, “under mounting criticism of court ineffi-
ciency and excessive delays in litigation, the courts adopted a strategic goal of docket-clearing,
which meant expanding and upgrading the courts’ own case settlement services through in-
court . . . mediation substitutes”); Connie Reeve, The Quandary of Setting Standards for
Mediators: Where Are We Headed?, 23 QUEEN’S L.J. 441, 468 (1998) (in Canada, mediation used
to “remove cases from the court docket”).
87 Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, Note, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE
L. REV. 367, 375 (2001) (in Nevada, “mediation sessions employ experienced settlement judges
to help reduce the court’s overcrowded docket”); Nancy A. Welsh, supra note 12, at 25 (2001)
(mediation can in certain cases “bear an uncanny resemblance to the judicially hosted settlement
conference”).
88 Judge Charles E. Clawson, The Use of Mediation in the 20th District, 40 ARK. LAW. 26
(2005) (calculating that “mediation assisted settlement” succeeds in freeing “12 days” to handle
other cases in the court’s docket).
89 Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.
241, 249 (2006) (noting how court-annexed mediation “can reduce cost or delay for a significant
percentage of litigants”); Engler, supra notes 64, at 2031-32 (“reports of high settlement
rates . . . provide justification for, and added momentum to, the call for more court-connected
mediation”); Judith V. Caprez & Micki A. Armstrong, A Study of Domestic Mediation Outcomes
with Indigent Parents, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 415, 425 (2001) (assessing success of court-annexed
mediation through the number of settlements).
90 James Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation Is Institutionalized: To the Parties,
Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 307, 312 (1994) (quoting
Carol Liebman that “[i]t is difficult to maintain quality when you have mediators . . . who are
doing a number of [mediations] every day, with little or no supervision,” and without “the input
and check of a co-mediator”).
91 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts
among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1925 (1997) (referring to court mediators
who “have extensive training” and mediators who “are generally untrained and placed on a
court roster because of their litigation experience or activity in bench or bar activities”).
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in the basic—let alone the more sophisticated—techniques of qual-
ity mediation.92
Moreover, unlike litigants who have resources to investigate—
usually through attorneys—the quality, background, and orienta-
tion of a mediator before retaining the mediator, low-income liti-
gants have no such choice.93  There is no “market” for court-
annexed mediators: low-income litigants have no power to choose
a superior “product.”  “Bad” mediators can thus continue in court-
annexed programs with little or no scrutiny, especially given that
the confidentiality of mediation insulates mediators from observa-
tion by the court or others.94  Moreover, low-income litigants have
little or no understanding of what mediation is or should be and do
not have lawyers to make that assessment for them.  Such litigants,
then, rarely articulate concerns about the quality of the mediation
because they have no frame of reference as to what constitutes
“quality” to begin with.
4. The Lack of Attorneys for Low-Income
Mediation Participants
Mediation, even given its different premises from litigation, is
still conducted “in the shadow of the law.”95  Low-income litigants,
however, cannot afford lawyers, and the need for lawyers far out-
strips the availability of legal services or pro bono attorneys to re-
92 This problem flows into the larger questions of what qualifications a mediator should have
in order to mediate.  There is no consensus as to such qualifications.  Timothy Lohmar et al.,
Student Project, A Survey of Domestic Mediator Qualifications and Suggestions for a Uniform
Paradigm, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 217 (1998); W. Lee Dobbins, The Debate Over Mediator Qualifi-
cations: Can They Satisfy the Growing Need to Measure Competence without Barring Entry into
the Market?, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95 (1995).
93 Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real
Disputants about Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573,
603–04 (2004) (individual litigants do not have power to choose the model a mediator adheres
to).
94 A good example of this point is the difficulty that mediation participants face when seek-
ing to establish through a judicial proceeding that a mediator has engaged in wrongdoing.  For an
extended discussion of a troubling mediation and the narrator’s efforts to seek redress, see Pene-
lope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer’s Role in Divorce Mediation, 28
FAM. L.Q. 177 (1994). See also Welsh, supra note 12, at 86 (alluding to “the difficulty of protect-
ing the confidentiality of communications and conduct occurring during a mediation session
when the court must determine whether a mediator . . . engaged in undue influence”).
95 Sharon Press, Mediator Ethical Breaches: Implications for Public Policy, 6 PENN ST. Y.B.
ON ARB. & MED. 107, 136 (2014); James J. Aflini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the
Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171 (2001).  The
phrase originally comes from Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case for Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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present them.96  This is not a matter of a litigant who “doesn’t have
an attorney and refuses to get one” or an exercise of “autonomy”:
rather, it is a matter of a litigant who wants an attorney but cannot
afford one.97
The lack of an attorney compromises the value of mediation in
a number of ways.  Without an attorney, litigants do not know what
to expect in mediation, which inhibits their ability to engage fully
in it.98  Indeed, what little empirical evidence there is suggests that
retaining counsel enhances the quality of the mediation99 or is at
worst inconclusive.100  Conversely, pro se litigants are often not
versed in potential legal rights or remedies available to them.
Without an attorney, there is no one to explain that what might
seem “fair” in mediation would entail waiving rights or reme-
dies.101  This is why litigants who can afford lawyers usually retain
them, which is itself proof of the importance of representation.
96 One study found that “nearly one million cases . . . were rejected by legal aid programs
owing to insufficient resources.” BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 170–71 (2012)
(“nearly a million cases (one out of every two seeking representation. See also DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUST. 5 (2004) (“[i]n most family, housing, bankruptcy, and small claims
court, the majority of litigants lack legal representation”); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos
Bibas, Triaging Appointed Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. REV. 967,
972 (2012).
97 ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 14 (2011).  Perhaps
through lack of experience in litigation involving low-income clients, some commentators and
courts assume that proceeding pro se is a matter of choice as opposed to necessity.  Carolynn
Clark Camp, Mediating the Indissoluble Family: Mediator Style in Domestic Relations Cases, 26
BYU J. PUB. L. 187, 207 (2012) (“[w]hile some parties remain pro se, most who enter litigation
feel compelled to hire attorneys to guide them through the process”); Fleck v. Fleck, 337 N.W.2d
786, 791 (N.D. 1983) (a settlement is appropriate so long as “a party was aware that he or she
had the right to consult with an attorney”).
98 Blankley, supra note 78, at 670–71 (2013) (noting that “pro se litigants are less likely to
understand” mediation).
99 The most recent and most sustained examination of this issue is Jean Sternlight, Lawy-
erless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381 (2010).  Another
article that points to the value and importance of representation in mediation is Craig McEwen
et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Di-
vorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995).
100 Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical Research,
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419 (2010) (noting how “existing research . . . is too limited in several
respects to be able to conclude that lawyers either play an essential role in mediation or are not
needed, or that they are particularly helpful or detrimental to the mediation process”).
101 See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 835–36 (1999) (discussing the
importance of pro se litigants knowing their “legal entitlements”); Amy G. Applegate & Connie
J.A. Beck, Self-Represented Parties in Mediation: Fifty Years Later It Remains the Elephant in the
Room, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 87, 89–90 (2013). One way to conceptualize this issue is through the
idea of “BATNA,” which stands for “best alternative to a negotiated agreement.”  ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
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Moreover, the lack of an attorney can be damaging, if not cat-
astrophic, should there be a power differential in the mediation.102
Power differentials come in many forms: a tenant has less power
than landlord, as does a debtor against a creditor, or a homeowner
against a lender.103  Another power differential is when one partici-
pant has an attorney and another participant does not.104  An even
more controversial issue arises when a victim of domestic violence
could or does participate in mediation.  While there is an ongoing
debate about whether mediation is ever appropriate in such cir-
cumstances, an attorney representing the victim is, at a minimum,
in an excellent position to identify whether there is domestic vio-
lence, and, if there is, to ameliorate the power differential often
inherent in such a mediation.105
IV. THE REALITIES OF PARTICIPATING IN MEDIATION FOR
LOW-INCOME PARTICIPANTS
The disjunction between discussion of mediation in the ab-
stract and its realities “on the ground” is critical.106  It is not unu-
sual to assume that, as one scholar has put it, “parties in a
mediation generally plan for the process, are accompanied by their
lawyers, and travel to the courthouse or office building.”107  The
97–106 (2d ed. 1991).  It is difficult to assess BATNA without understanding the litigation
alternative.
102 Many scholars have examined how “power differentials” can render mediation inappro-
priate or dangerous. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice
and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1, 15–16 (“power differentials may mean that mediation is simply an inappropriate fo-
rum for some subset of cases in which the potential for party coercion dictates that individual
rights cannot be adequately protected”).
103 As noted supra at 71–79, these are common areas where low-income litigants participate
in court-annexed mediation.
104 Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and
Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 47 (2011).
105 For two examples in this voluminous literature, see Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and
Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Vio-
lence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145 (2003); Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domes-
tic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens, 39 FAM.
L.Q. 53 (2005). E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, “What’s Going On” in Mediation: An
Empirical Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator’s Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary
Benefit, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 107 (2004).
106 Welsh, supra note 93, at 576–77 (the mediation “process generally has adapted to respond
to the needs, expectations, and constraints of the environments in which it is found”).
107 Welsh, supra note 12, at 89.  Welsh, however, does note that the travel is not necessarily
voluntary. Id. at 90.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\17-3\CAC312.txt unknown Seq: 19 28-MAR-16 16:02
2016] THE SOCIOECONOMICS OF MEDIATION 891
day-to-day realities of low-income mediation participants, how-
ever, are not so smooth.  While minimal resources might not ap-
pear to have a direct impact on mediation, they, in fact, do, and at
a profound level.
To illustrate this point, consider limitations on participating in
mediation that are not a function of the forum itself, but of logis-
tics.  These furnish a bedrock context which is integral to how ef-
fective mediation can be for the low-income population.108
The most basic hurdle that must be faced before mediation
participants can participate in mediation is getting and staying at
the place where the mediation is going to happen.  This is not a
trivial concern for many.  Consider the interlocking challenges low-
income people face in their day to day lives:109
• Child Care.  Child care can be expensive, and few child care
providers can accommodate the non-standard working hours
that are a hallmark of low-wage work.110  Moreover, children in
low-income households experience more health issues than
others, thus intensifying the challenges of finding adequate and
affordable child care.
• Nonstandard Work Hours.  Given the pressing need to work to
support themselves and their families, low-wage workers often
must work varying shifts over which they have little or no con-
trol.111  This is, in many ways, a defining characteristic of low-
wage work.
• Reliance on Mass Transportation.  A car is expensive to buy and
maintain.  As a result, many low-income individuals, especially
108 While focusing on urban populations, the succeeding discussion also applies in many re-
spects to residents of low-income communities.  Francesca Devaney Callan & Elizabeth M. Do-
lan, Parenting Constraints and Supports of Young Low-Income Mothers in Rural United States,
44 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 157 (2013).
109 The information that follows is drawn from Rhonda Smith, Work and Family: Workers
with Nonstandard Hours Face Child Care, Transit Obstacles, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.bna.com/workers-nonstandard-hours-n17179875800/.
110 Id.
111 This has become a substantial problem as more low-wage work has become part-time
work.  Robin R. Runge, Redefining Leave from Work, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & Pol’y 445,
450 (2012) (“[n]early half of low-wage hourly workers cannot control their work schedule,
choose starting and quitting times, or decide when to take breaks”); Steven Greenhouse, A Part-
Time Life, as Hours Shrink and Shift, N.Y. TIMES (OCT. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/28/business/a-part-time-life-as-hours-shrink-and-shift-for-american-workers.html. See also
Jeounghee Kim, Barriers to Work among Poor Families: Health Limitations, Family Structure,
and Lack of Job Opportunities, 8 J. POL’Y PRAC. 317, 325 (2009).  For a compelling narrative
about the struggles of low-wage work, including the variability of hours, see BARBARA
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001).
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in urban areas, must rely on mass transportation, often buses, to
travel to the location of a mediation.112  Bus passengers are at
the mercy of schedules, which vary given the time of day and
pick up and destinations.  Moreover, travelers using buses must
face the vagaries of breakdowns, congestion, and shifts in sched-
uling due to holidays and weather.  Moreover, even the seem-
ingly modest expense of public transportation is meaningful to a
person whose wages are minimal.
• Hourly Wages.  Salaried workers often have personal days avail-
able or flexibility to work off-site without losing pay.  Most low-
income wage-earners, however, are hourly workers, and hourly
workers do not get paid if they do not work.113  A longer media-
tion means less pay, as does an extended commute to a media-
tion session.
• Fear of Job Loss.  In the world of low-wage work, missing time
risks losing a job.  This has potentially catastrophic consequences
for wage-earners’ ability to provide for themselves or their fami-
lies,114 and leads to the uncertainty of looking for another job.115
The confluence of these factors demonstrates that not only are
courts able to devote limited resources to court-connected pro-
grams, but time and money constrain participants themselves in
how long they can participate in mediation.
V. PRICING DIFFERENT MODELS
Thus far, this Article has offered an overview of “models” of
mediation, the economics of the mediation available to those who
may or must participate in mediation, the lack of representation
112 A compelling, life-and-death example of this difference involved Hurricane Katrina, when
New Orleans residents with resources had flown or driven away from the City, while the lower-
income population were left to ride on unreliable buses which only went to the chaotic and
dangerous Super Dome.  L. Darnell Weeden, The Black Eye of Hurricane Katrina’s Post Jim
Crow Syndrome is a Basic Human Dignity Challenge for America, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 93, 106
(2008).
113 The hourly wage is the norm for low-paid work, as the debate for a minimum hourly wage
demonstrates.  There is no debate for a minimum yearly wage because such a debate has no
relevance for the vast majority of work available to low-wage workers.
114 An irony in family mediation in particular is that risk of losing wages or a job has an
impact on the ability to pay child support, which, in turn, adds or creates arrearages.  For a
discussion of this vicious circle and misleading stereotypes about “deadbeat dads,” see Daniel L.
Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897 (2013).
115 See Runge, supra note 111, at 450 (for low-income hourly wage earners, “missing a single
day or work or work for any reason . . . could lead to job loss”).
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available to low-income participants, and the logistical burdens
that confront low-income litigants.  This Article will now revisit the
“models” debate with this background in mind.116
At first glance, the prior discussion of mediation models,117
and discussions of models generally, appear decontextualized.
This, however, is not true.  Everything has a context: the absence of
a specific context only means that the context is unspoken.118  Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow has observed that mediation “in all of its
forms [is] not neutral [but] designed and implemented by parties,
court administrators or governments with substantive agendas.”119
Those who adhere to leading “models” of mediation call for
universal application of their particular model.120  This is, under-
standably, based on strongly-held views of the benefits of their con-
ception of what mediation should be.  “Conceptions,” however,
can only go so far in taking into account messy realities.  The issue
then becomes what models mean “as applied” in a world of limited
resources, not “as applied” in the context of unlimited resources—
something that is often presupposed in discussions of what model is
best.
What follows, then, is another discussion of each of the mod-
els, but with a difference: it surfaces otherwise hidden contexts.
The end result is that one model—the evaluative model—must be-
come the predominant model in a world of scarce resources for
mediation.
116 For the initial summary of different models of mediation, see supra notes 35–51.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 35–51.
118 A compelling explanation of this idea is in an interdisciplinary study by James C.  Scott.
JAMES C.  SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998).  Scott elucidates the idea that a description of anything must
exclude what it does not view as significant.  Such an exclusion thereby becomes invisible, yet it
defines what is being examined. This insight also informs the foundation of critical theory: criti-
cal race theory, for example, critiques law as inherently racist even when it appears to be “neu-
tral” or “logical.” The most famous elucidation of this idea is Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).
119 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of
ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (2000).  Menkel-Meadow notes that anthropologist
Laura Nader was an important innovator in this regard.  For an example of Laura Nader’s work
in this area, see Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacifi-
cation in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993).
120 Bush, supra note 2, at 2.
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A. Transformative Mediation
The transformative model offers participants an opportunity
to experience “empowerment and recognition.”121  In providing a
space for participants to experience these shifts, the transformative
mediator follows the lead of participants and does not influence
the direction in which they wish to go during the mediation.  As a
result, transformative mediation requires, as Bush and Folger note,
“great patience.”  Patience, however, cannot flourish in a world
where speed and efficiency rule.  Indeed, Bush and Folger criticize
the settlement-driven, docket-clearing goals of court-annexed or
mandated programs.122 A question, then, is the degree to which
transformative mediation can ever be achieved in a setting in which
there is little time for participants to follow their own path or for
the mediator to follow them along it.
Given that transformative mediation requires space and time,
meaningful discussions of transformative mediation must assume
the same.  The extended example Bush and Folger employ to illus-
trate their transformative model—the “Purple House” media-
tion—sets forth a representative circumstance necessary for their
model to operate.123  The Purple House Mediation involves a dis-
pute between homeowners in which one homeowner—the Chair of
the development’s “architectural control committee”—objects to
the color that another homeowner has painted her house.  A racial
dimension is embedded in the problem: the Chair is white and the
homeowner is black.  Consider elements of this situation:
• The mediation is not court-connected.
• The homeowners live in an “exclusive (and expensive) hous-
ing development.”124
• The homeowners have lawyers.125
• The mediator is a “private practitioner” retained by the
parties.126
121 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 68.
122 Some have noted, however, that Bush and Folger’s critique is broader, and aimed at a
range of settings apart from courts.  Lisa P. Gaynier, Transformative Mediation: In Search of a
Theory of Practice, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 397, 401 (2005).
123 The name of the Chapter in which the example appears says so explicitly: “Putting Trans-
formative Theory into Practice.”  BUSH, supra note 2, at 131.
124 Id. at 132.
125 Id. at 133.
126 Id.  There is, however, no mention of how much the mediator charges or how payment of
these fees will be allocated.  For a discussion of the cost of private mediation, see infra text
accompanying notes 52–63.
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• The mediator has contacted the parties prior to the actual
mediation in order to explain what mediation is.127
• Time appears not to be an issue: “the mediator remains
ready to follow the parties wherever they may decide to go
next.”128
• There is no judge waiting for a report on what has or has not
been accomplished in the mediation.
This setting offers Bush and Folger an excellent means to ex-
plore the nuances of their model.  Over the course of over fifty
pages, Bush and Folger provide a verbatim text of what is said in
this simulated mediation, and they pause after four “segments” of
the transcript to provide detailed commentary on what is
happening.129
The Purple House Mediation, however, is set in a specific so-
cioeconomic context in which the participants have ample re-
sources available to them.  Perhaps the most crucial resource of all
is a great deal of time.  This is almost certainly a necessity: such a
setting affords a means to effectively explore, explain, and, by ex-
tension, practice transformative mediation.
How, then, might a comparable mediation operate if each of
these characteristics were answered differently?  Consider re-char-
acterizing the Purple House mediation in a low-resourced context:
• The mediation is court-connected through an in-house
program.
• The participants live in public housing.
• The participants cannot afford lawyers and have not been
able to secure lawyers because of the limited availability of
legal services.
• The mediator is from a court roster and is provided by the
Court with no input from the parties.
• The mediator has never met or spoken to the parties prior
to the mediation.
• Given court schedules and the availability of court person-
nel, the mediation must conclude by the middle of the after-
noon and can only extend for one session.  In light of these
time constraints, a break for lunch is a luxury that the par-
ticipants cannot afford.
127 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 133.
128 Id. at 184.
129 Id. at 133–84.
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• A judge awaits to learn whether the case has been success-
fully settled or not, and, if not, the court will either conduct
a trial that day or set the case down for trial whenever the
next available trial date is available which, given the nature
of overwhelmed dockets, will not be for months.
It is impossible to see how anything deserving the name transform-
ative mediation could operate in this context.  After all, how can a
mediator “follow the parties wherever they may decide to go
next”130 if there is barely enough time to even begin to make the
trip?
B. Facilitative Mediation
As with transformative mediation, the benefits of facilitative
mediation do not come cheaply.  In fact, the invisible context of
discussion of facilitative mediation is integral to the ability of the
model to function as it is intended to do so.
Consider a text by Christopher Moore that presents the
facilitative model.131  The book is well-known and for good reason:
Moore offers effective conceptualizations of the causes of conflict
and appropriate interventions,132 with perhaps the most detailed
and sophisticated exploration of “stages of mediator moves” in the
mediation literature.133  In over 650 pages, Moore offers a compre-
hensive discussion of the mediation process.  There is, however,
one thing Moore’s work does not address: mediation involving low-
income participants with substantial resource limitations.
Moore employs an example comparable to Bush and Folger’s
Purple House Mediation—what he calls the “Singson and Whit-
tamore Dispute.”  He draws upon this example in some detail in
his first chapter134 and then alludes to it from time to time through-
out the text.135  The dispute involves three physicians and the en-
forcement of a covenant not to compete.136  As with the Purple
House Mediation, there is nothing wrong with Moore’s example.
130 See supra text accompanying note 50.
131 MOORE, supra note 22.  Moore does not explicitly self-identify as a facilitative mediator,
but his facilitative, settlement-driven approach leaves no doubt that he is one.
132 Id. at 64–65.
133 Moore lists 12 “stages.” Id. at 68–69.
134 Id. at 4–14.
135 See id. at 72–74, 264–65, 356–57.
136 Id. at 4–5.
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He uses it effectively to illustrate his ideas.  Moore does not specify
his assumptions, but they are there nevertheless:
• The participants do not have financial limitations.
• The mediation is not court-annexed.
• It appears that participants have legal counsel because they
assess the value of a “judicial approach” to resolving their
dispute.”137
Moore’s omissions are telling, however.  Consider, for example,
payment of fees.  The only time Moore mentions fees is in the last
chapter of the book, when he notes: “[i]ntermediaries are expected
to disclose to the parties at the beginning of any intervention the
‘bases of compensation, fees, and charges.’  Where appropriate,
they should provide pro bono services.”138
Note that even this passing reference is about giving notice to
participants of fees: it is not about the ability of parties to afford
any or all of the fees and the impact this might have on the conduct
of the mediation.139  The mention of pro bono services implies that
there is a need for them, but there is nothing further about the
degree to which such services are available.
Moore does devote one paragraph to court-annexed media-
tion.140  The paragraph is in the context of a general discussion
about the growth of mediation.141  The paragraph does not offer a
discussion of issues related to court-annexed mediation explored in
this Article, including resource limitations.  To the contrary, the
only qualitative assessment of these programs is a general refer-
ence to how these programs “have a record of success.”142
C. Evaluative Mediation
If transformative and facilitative mediation, at least in their
“pure” forms, require time and resources, evaluative mediation—
137 MOORE, supra note 22, at 10.
138 Id. at 449 (emphasis in original).  The quote is from The Association of Conflict Resolu-
tion Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility.
139 Moore himself began CDR Associates, a prominent firm that primarily serves governmen-
tal entities and large businesses. CDR ASSOCIATES, http://cdrassociates.org/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2016).
140 See supra note 22, at 29.
141 See supra note 22, at 22–33.
142 Id. at 29.
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the last of the “big three”143 models—remains.  In fact, low-income
people are far more likely to encounter evaluative mediators in
court-annexed settings.144  The most fundamental reason is that
courts in which low-income litigants encounter litigation are over-
whelmed.145  A docket-control regime must value “efficiency”
above all.  The more cases removed from dockets, the fewer cases a
court needs to devote substantial time to, which, in turn, means
that a court can make do with fewer resources—a kind of feedback
loop.146  This generates more evaluation because, as noted above, a
characteristic cited by proponents of evaluative mediation is its
efficiency.147
Efficiency, however, leads to troubling consequences: as one
commentator has noted, there is “immense” pressure on courts to
send cases to mediation and, unsurprisingly, “im-
mense . . . pressures on mediators to obtain settlements.148  Notions
of voluntariness and self-determination become compromised.149
This is so even though there is evidence suggesting the value of at
least incorporating facilitative techniques.150  Consider the follow-
ing summary of the experience of mediators in court-connected
mediation programs:
[M]any court-connected mediators acknowledge that they can-
not conduct a facilitative mediation process if they are to meet
the expectations of their workplace.  They express enormous
frustration at being caught between a rock and a hard place as
they are asked to deliver high quality mediation services in what
they know to be a fraction of the time required to effectively do
143 See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.
144 Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons
from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 418 (2004) (“even
though court-connected mediation is often described as a ‘facilitative’ process[,] . . . the process
is often characterized by evaluative interventions similar to interventions used traditionally by
judges in settlement conferences”).
145 See supra text accompanying note 79.
146 Rubinson, supra note 62, at 104–06 (discussing how courts are “reactive institutions” that
must provide additional resources to the extent that users of courts demand it).
147 See supra text accompanying note 39.
148 Engler, supra note 64, at 2010; Alfini, supra note 90, at 310 (referring to judicial pressure
on mediators “to push” and “cajole” to promote settlement).
149 King, supra note 68, at 467 (“docket reduction” takes “precedence over mediation’s val-
ues for free party choice of settlement” and, if so, “many of mediation’s benefits will be
compromised”).
150 Eisenberg, supra note 69, (describing a study in Maryland that recommends that
“mediators should spend more time listening, reflecting emotions, values, and issues, and asking
the parties how they want to resolve the case—rather than telling them what to do . . . or di-
recting them to something”).
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so, often with cases that are not appropriate for mediation.  Ac-
cording to one veteran court mediator who requested anonym-
ity, “In recent years, encouraging families toward self-
determination and private ordering have taken a back seat.  Me-
diation services, which are mandated, are adversely affected be-
cause administrators move their workforce toward evaluation
services.”  Another mediator and court services supervisor re-
ferring to the common practice of recommending settlements
said, “The process is called mediation and we settle cases, but it
certainly isn’t real mediation.”151
In some instances, there is a process at which many a facilita-
tive mediator would cringe.152  These are called, in the vernacular,
“trashing and bashing” by a “mediator” who does everything in her
power to belittle the merits of each party’s case (the “trash”) as a
means to make any decision not to settle irrational (the “bash”).153
While, as some have noted, court-annexed mediation in and of
itself lends mediation a more “legalistic” bend which, in turn, pro-
motes a greater tendency to evaluate,154 evaluative mediation still
tends to more easily operate within limited time than any other
model of mediation.  And, as noted above,155 many scholars who
focus on mediation are, at best, dubious that evaluative mediation
is mediation at all instead of a settlement conference or negotia-
tion—the adversary system merely dressed up as mediation.  An
irony, then, is that among low-income populations, sophisticated,
nuanced alternatives to litigation, developed with the promise of
self-determination, voluntariness, and empowerment, have now be-
151 Salem, supra note 84, at 378. See also Welsh, supra note 93, at 589 (“court-connected
mediators are unlikely to act as wholly disinterested parties who view their role as purely facilita-
tive”); Alfini, supra note 90, at 310 (quoting Robert Baruch Bush as noting how a “directive
model of practice [in court-connected contexts] seems quite predominant”. . .).  Interestingly,
some jurisdictions have felt the need to explicitly give evaluative mediation its imprimatur as an
appropriate form of mediation.  Welsh, supra note 93, at 591 (“[m]any courts have promulgated
ethics codes for court-connected mediation that permit mediators to engage in . . . evaluative
functions”).
152 Some commentators are more measured.  They claim that evaluative mediation may, at
times, be appropriate in the court-annexed context.  Boyarin, supra note 67 (in some instances,
“evaluative mediation . . . may be precisely what the parties want” even though, in other circum-
stances, it may “undermine self-determination”).
153 Reeve, supra note 87, at 468; James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This
the End of “Good Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991).
154 See, e.g., KOVACH, supra note 6, at 24 (as the “ADR universe has become integrated into
the legal system, it has become ‘legalized’”).
155 See supra text accompanying notes 46.
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come yet another means to dispense mass justice—the process me-
diation was meant to supplant.156
In the end, then, the issue is not so much which model is
“best,” but, rather, how institutionalized mediation constrains
mediators to either exclusively or primarily evaluate.157  This is so
even if a mediator is self-identified as “facilitative” or if the media-
tor employs, as many mediators do, an “eclectic approach” based
upon evolving circumstances in a specific mediation.158  Thus, often
in institutionalized contexts, a mediator has no choice but to be
evaluative: the process demands it.
VI. BACK TO THE GRID: REVISITING LAWYERS
AND MEDIATION
Given that realities must limit or even make it impossible to
implement two models of mediation, the “models” debate needs to
be reconceptualized.  There have been repeated calls to enhance
resources and thereby enable mediation to fulfill its promise.159
This is, of course, a right answer, but the proposal is virtually im-
possible to implement: additional funding for mediation programs
at a time of budget austerity is unlikely.160  Even if it should hap-
pen, it might simply lead to more efficient docket control, which
does not answer the problems identified in this Article.  Moreover,
redirection of judicial budgets to mediation programs is also un-
likely because budgets for the judiciary in virtually every jurisdic-
tion are stretched.161  Should that even happen, reducing resources
156 WALDMAN, supra note 97, at 118.
157 It is also telling that jurisdictions have explicitly adopted “self-determination” as the ulti-
mate goal of mediation even though brief mediations in an evaluative style compromise self-
determination.  For an overview, see Welsh, supra note 12, at 33–59. Welsh examines two states
in detail—Florida and Minnesota—and finds that while both accept evaluative mediation as ac-
ceptable in their court-connected programs, both feel the need to “tame” them because of the
risks associated with it. Id. at 34.  This is the mediation equivalent of protesting too much and,
by doing so, there is a recognition of the risk of compromising self-determination in many court-
connected programs.  Welsh, supra note 12, at 33–59.
158 Some have explicitly argued for the value of such a hybrid approach. See, e.g., John
Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 321, 327 (2000) (ad-
vocating the integration of different approaches to mediation”).
159 See, e.g., King, supra note 68.
160 McCrory, supra note 72, at 828 (“[i]t is unlikely that legislatures will be willing to, or
courts will be able to, fully fund high quality court-mandated programs”).
161 Chief Justice Roberts has spoken on this address as to the federal system.  Adam Liptak,
Budget Cuts Imperil Federal Court System, Roberts Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/us/politics/budget-cuts-imperil-court-system-chief-justice-says.html.
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from other segments of the judiciary will likely intensify the
“docket control” problem by having fewer resources available for
litigating cases, which then turns resource allocation into a zero
sum game.162
The question, then, is to consider ways to sidestep the “more
funding for mediation programs” solution and consider more plau-
sible options.  One way to do so is to circle back to the seemingly
unsolvable issue of the substantial undersupply of lawyers for low-
income litigants.163  It is possible that greater involvement of law-
yers in mediation can serve to draw upon the non-adversarial con-
ception of mediation as embodied in facilitative and transformative
models.
The value of this idea is embedded in how discussions of mod-
els of mediation assume that participants are or have the option to
be represented, and thereby recognize that legal representation
both is and should be the norm.164  The value of representation is
sometimes stated explicitly in law.  A remarkable example is what
is known as the “four legals” in Virginia165—a set of statements
that all Virginia mediators must communicate to mediation partici-
pants.  The “four legals” are:
(i) The neutral does not provide legal advice,
(ii) Any mediated agreement may affect the legal rights of
the parties,
(iii) Each party to the mediation has the opportunity to con-
sult with independent legal counsel at any time and is
encouraged to do so, and
Virtually every state court system faces comparable challenges.  For examples, see Infocus: Judi-
cial Branch Budget Crisis, CALIF. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/courtsbudget
.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2016); Associated Press, Alabama Judges Warn of Impacts from Pro-
posed Budget Cuts, WASH. TIMES (April 18, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/
apr/18/alabama-judges-warn-of-impacts-from-proposed-budge/; NYCLA, COURTS IN CRISIS
(2013).
162 For an extended discussion of the dynamics of the distribution of judicial resources, see
Rubinson, supra note 62.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 125, 137.
165 Paula M. Young, Teaching the Ethical Values Governing Mediator Impartiality Using Short
Lectures, Buzz Group Discussions, Video Clips, A Defining Features Matrix, Games, and an
Exercise Based on Grievances Filed against Florida Mediators, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 309,
333 n. 131 (2011).
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(iv) Each party to the mediation should have any draft
agreement reviewed by independent counsel prior to
signing the agreement.166
This statute perfectly captures a fundamental disconnect: parties
should be given an “opportunity” to retain counsel and “should”
have an agreement reviewed by counsel.  The problem is “opportu-
nity” is a sham if a party cannot take advantage of the “opportu-
nity.”167  Some articulations go even further and articulate a
“right” to counsel,168 but “rights,” while carrying rhetorical power,
are meaningless if participants have no resources to exercise
them.169
The rest of this Article will now explore the possibilities and
challenges of implementing programs that include lawyers as an in-
tegral element of the mediation process.
A. The Challenges
For many mediators—especially non-lawyers—attorneys rep-
resenting participants in mediation is not a good thing.  The fear is
that attorneys will transform a collaborative process into an adver-
sarial one.170  While this view is not universal,171 it remains a com-
mon point of view.
166 VA CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.12 (West 2015).  A mediator’s failure to state the “four legals”
is ground for vacating any orders or agreements reached as a result of the mediation. Id.
167 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 101, at 832 (noting that a “requirement” that “unrepresented
parties consult with attorney before signing any agreements . . . is not particularly helpful given
the pervasive problem in inability to afford counsel”).
168 Felix Steffek et al., Guide for Regulating Dispute Resolution (GRDR): Principles 5, in
REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS (Felix
Steffek et al. eds., 2013) (providing a model statute that “parties should have the right to be
accompanied and advised by counsel”).  It is noteworthy that at least one country—Belgium—
goes further and provides “that legal assistance for mediation is provided.”  Ivan Verougstraete,
Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Belgium: Workable Solutions, in REGULATING DISPUTE RES-
OLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 93, 107.
169 Virginia is not the only state that expresses the disconnect between advising mediation
participants of the importance of counsel while providing many of them no means to obtain legal
services.  Illinois, for example, holds that mediators should “ensure that the parties have been
advised to obtain legal counsel.” PROF. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR MEDIATORS § VI (MEDI-
ATION COUNCIL ILL. 2003).
170 See Jean Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
269, 315 (1999) (proposing strategies to insure attorneys are a positive force in mediation); Leo-
nard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 57–59 (1982).  Another concern is that
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A second and related point is the unfortunate reality that
many lawyers do not understand mediation.172  Some of this might
be attributable to concern that lawyers co-opt mediation because
of a fear it will impinge on the legal profession’s monopoly on dis-
pute resolution,173 but the issue runs deeper.  The stock in trade of
lawyers is to view conflict through the lens of adversarial litigation,
which, by definition, only includes facts deemed “relevant” by rules
of law and excludes all others.174  In contrast, as Lon Fuller said as
noted above, mediation is all about jettisoning “formal prescrip-
tions laid down in advance,”175 of which law is the prime example.
Lawyers operating without law is an oxymoron and thus, some ar-
gue, lawyers inevitably subvert the essence of mediation.176
B. The Possibilities
1. The Spread of Mediation Within the Legal Profession
While concerns about whether attorneys contribute to or di-
minish the value of mediation, there is cause for optimism.  There
are two reasons why this is the case.
The first is a spreading conception that lawyers are problem-
solvers rather than problem intensifiers.  The trend is the result of a
confluence of a number of ideas that have been percolating and
coalescing over time: “problem solving negotiation” first articu-
lawyers or retired judges acting as mediators bring a litigation mindset to mediation, thereby
portending “the end of good mediation.”  Alfini, supra note 153, at 50.
171 McEwen, supra note 99.  Interestingly, there is some consensus internationally about the
importance of representation in ADR, including mediation.  Steffek, supra note 168 (alluding to
the importance of “legal aid” for ADR).
172 It is also notable that not all attorneys effectively represent clients in mediation. See Allen
v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that the court is “concerned that coun-
sel . . . failed to advise his clients of the seriousness and finality of signing a settlement agree-
ment”); Bryan, supra note 94 (presenting a detailed first-person narrative of an attorney who
coerces a vulnerable mediation participant into a settlement in the presence of a power
differential).
173 Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Profes-
sional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235 (2002)
(“[l]awyers have a longstanding monopoly on the law business and do not look favorably on
sharing their power with non-lawyers”).
174 Rubinson, supra note 45, at 75–76.
175 Fuller, supra note 44.
176 Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers and Divorce Mediation: Designing the Role of “Outside
Counsel,” 12 MEDIATION Q. 17, 26 (1986) (“[f]or outside counsel to advocate a client’s interests
contradicts the very essence of mediation”).
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lated in Roger Fisher and William Ury’s “Getting to Yes”;177 “cli-
ent-centered lawyering”;178 and “therapeutic jurisprudence.”179
These trends have both informed mediation and have been in-
formed by it.180
Another trend is that the legal profession is embracing media-
tion as a core competency for modern law practice.  There are calls
for incorporating mediation into law school curricula181  and there
are increasing numbers of mediation clinics in law schools.182
Some of these include students acting as lawyers in representing
clients in mediation.183  The American Bar Association sponsors a
“Representation in Mediation Competition” for law students.184
Law school texts have appeared on representing clients in media-
177 The leading text is GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN.
FISHER, supra note 9.
178 The leading text on these ideas, which have been particularly influential in clinical legal
education, is DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH (2d ed. 1991).
179 Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 184, 185 (1997).  Winick defines therapeutic jurisprudence as exploring “ways in which,
consistent with principles of justice and other constitutional values, the knowledge, theories, and
insights of the mental health and related disciplines can help shape the therapist or therapeutic
agent.”  The notion is that the application of “law” has the potential to promote healthy, thera-
peutic outcomes. Id.
180 F. Peter Phillips, “There Is a World Elsewhere”: Preliminary Studies on Alternatives to
Interest-Based Bargaining, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 413, 414 (“[t]he modern American
process is classically stated in the influential book “Getting to Yes”); Collette R. Brunschwig,
Multisensory Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: How Family Mediators Can Better Communi-
cate with Their Clients, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 705 (2012).
181 Mary Dunnewold & Mary Trevor, Escaping the Appellate Litigation Straitjacket: Incorpo-
rating an Alternative Dispute Resolution Simulation into a First-Year Legal Writing Class, 18
LEGAL WRITING: J LEGAL WRITING INST. 209 (2012); C. Michael Bryce, ADR Education from a
Litigator/Educator Perspective, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 337 (2007).
182 Cynthia A. Savage, Recommendations Regarding Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 11
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 511, 513 n. 4 (2010) (referring to the “growing numbers of law
school mediation clinical programs”).
183 Kristen Blankley identifies Loyal University Chicago Law School, DePaul University Col-
lege of Law, Hamline Law School, the University of San Francisco, and Washing University
School of Law.  Blankley, supra note 78, at n. 170.  For a detailed description of one such pro-
gram called the “Pro Bono Mediation Project,” see Robert Rubinson, The Pro Bono Mediation
Project: Providing Free Representation to Self-Represented Litigants in Child Access Cases, in
INNOVATIONS FOR SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 77 (Bonnie Rose Hough & Pamela Cardullo
Ortiz eds., 2011).
184 Law Student National Representation in Mediation Competition, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/awards_competitions/law_student_national_re
presentation_in_mediation_competition.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).  The competition began
in 2006. Id.
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tion.185  Practitioners have also recognized the importance of repre-
sentation of clients in mediation: both practitioner-oriented texts186
and continuing legal education programs187 address the topic.
2. Harnessing Increasing Attorney Expertise
It appears, then, that as time passes, attorneys will understand
mediation in a way that is more sophisticated than viewing it as a
settlement conference or an assessment of potential success in liti-
gation.188  Should this be the case, a question arises as to how to
attract attorneys who have gained this expertise to represent low-
income mediation participants.
One idea proposed by Kristen M. Blankley is to offer attor-
neys an opportunity to represent clients in mediation through “lim-
ited scope agreements.”189  A concern of pro bono attorneys is that
litigation is often messy and unpredictable.  Commitment to client
representation imports such messiness and unpredictability.  Lim-
ited representation has the virtue of attracting practitioners to pro
bono work by limiting the scope of representation, thereby mini-
mizing the risk of an open-ended time commitment.190  The Ameri-
can Bar Association itself has taken action to promote the use of
such limited representation by relaxing the need for conflicts
checks when attorneys participate in a “nonprofit and court-an-
nexed limited legal services” program.191
185 HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING AS A PROBLEM-
SOLVER IN ANY COUNTRY OR CULTURE (2d ed. 2010); GOLANN, supra note 6.
186 SPENCER PUNNETT, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO OPTIMAL RE-
SULTS (2013).  At least one book focuses on the economic advantages of representing clients in
mediation and other “early negotiation” processes. JOHN LANDE, LAWYERING WITH PLANNED
EARLY NEGOTIATION: HOW YOU CAN GET GOOD RESULTS FOR CLIENTS AND MAKE MONEY
(2012).
187 Mediation Advocacy: Effective Legal Representation in Mediation, UPCHURCH WATSON
WHITE & MAX, http://www.uww-adr.com/seminar/florida-mediators-discuss-effective-legal-rep-
resentation (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); Effective Representation in Negotiation and Mediation,
LAWLINE, http://www.lawline.com/cle/course/effective-representation-in-mediation-and-negotia-
tion (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
188 James K.L. Lawrence, Mediation Advocacy: Partnering with the Mediator, 15 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 425 (1999).
189 Blankley, supra note 78.
190 A possible issue is that this is a zero sum game insofar as pro bono attorneys representing
clients in mediation will be less likely to perform pro bono work in other cases.  This might not
be the case, however, if pro bono work through limited representation attracted attorneys who
otherwise would not perform pro bono work at all.
191 MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 6.5 (ABA 2013) (imposes a need for conflicts
checks when a “lawyer provides short-term limited legal services to a client” when participating
in “a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization of a court” unless the attorney has actual
knowledge of a conflict).  At least one jurisdiction—Maryland—explicitly notes that the rule
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Another possibility is to promote even more the development
of law school clinics in which students act both as mediators and
represent clients in mediation.  The continuing adoption and re-
finement of such courses enhance the quality and practice of future
lawyers whether they act as mediators or not.  They would then be
better situated to not only provide quality representation in media-
tion, but also to participate in programs that provide pro bono rep-
resentation in mediation.  Moreover, students would directly
provide legal services to pro se mediation participants.  While this
will have at best, a modest impact on the extraordinary need for
representation, any additional resources are useful.  These students
would also most likely be supervised by faculty who know and un-
derstand the more sophisticated, non-adversarial forms of
mediation.
Even a modest corps of attorneys who become involved in me-
diation can be a force for good.  There would be a built-in correc-
tive to “bad” mediators who, in a confidential process, can act in a
way that subverts the promise of mediation.  Attorneys can amelio-
rate power differentials, including identifying instances of domestic
violence that a mediator or judicial screening protocols do not
catch.  Attorneys can enhance fair results, not just fair process, by
insuring participants with an otherwise limited familiarity of legal
norms will not be taken advantage of.
The possibility of attracting more lawyers to represent clients
in mediation, however, must be tempered with the lack of success
in encouraging greater attorney representation in civil cases.  These
calls are high on rhetoric and drama, but strikingly short on suc-
cess.192  That said, the appeal of mediation both to law students and
the profession at large is an exciting development, and mediation
proponents—and those who administer court-annexed programs—
can seek to harness enthusiasm into participation.  There also
might well be pushback from efficiency-minded courts, but perhaps
courts will recognize that participation by attorneys facilitates the
crafting of appropriate settlement agreements that are not only
fair, but also durable.  And that contributes to efficiency, albeit not
with the immediacy of a case speedily crossed off a docket.
encompasses “programs in which lawyers represent clients on a pro bono basis for the purposes
of mediation only.” Id. at R. 6.5 cmt. [1].  Some thirty-nine states have adopted some form of
Rule 6.5.
192 For a discussion of the underlying dynamic that makes redressing access to justice so diffi-
cult, see Rubinson, supra note 62.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Mediation has been called “an essential positive force in con-
stituting human identity and shared meaning”193 and a means to
“continue to survive and evolve as a species.”194  Such aspirations,
while hyperbolic, still assume a process with ample resources and
with practitioners possessing skills of the highest order.  They em-
body an ideal, however, that reflects only a limited percentage of
mediations that actually occur.
A description of any activity must, necessarily, simplify it.195
Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to approach mediation, with its
emphasis on being a party-driven process, without recognizing that
the process is wildly variable.  This variability is based on the ine-
quality of resources that are available to those who engage in the
process.  This, ultimately, does not reach the issue on whether me-
diation is a good thing or not for low-income individuals.  How-
ever, viewing mediation as disembodied without limitations of
time, space, or legal representation only teaches part of the story,
and a misleading one at that.
The key, then, is to avoid idealizing mediation.  It is situated in
the real world, and what makes mediation successful must, simi-
larly, be assessed based on what happens “on the ground.” Context
is key.  Without context, debates about models and grids do not get
at what the impact of this extraordinarily process has on those with
the least power and the greatest stakes.
193 BUSH, supra note 2, at 258.
194 Love, supra note 46, at 945.
195 See supra text accompanying note 118.
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